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Abstract A number of recent popular books about
gender differences have drawn on the neuroscientific
literature to support the claim that certain psycholog-
ical differences between the sexes are ‘hard-wired’.
This article highlights some of the ethical implications
that arise from both factual and conceptual errors
propagated by such books.
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Meet Sarah.
Sarah can “identify and anticipate what [her
husband] is feeling—often before he is conscious of
it himself.” ([4], p. 118). Like the magician who
knows that you’ll pick the seven of diamonds before
it’s even left the pack, Sarah can amaze her husband
at whim, thanks to her lucky knack of knowing what
he’s feeling before he even feels it. (Ta-DA! Is this
your emotion?) Sarah is neither a fairground psychic
nor the somewhat irresponsible owner of a futuristic
brain wave interpreting machine. She is simply a
woman who enjoys the miraculous gift of mind-
reading that, apparently, is bestowed on all owners of
a female brain:
‘Maneuvering like an F-15, Sarah’s female brain
is a high performance emotion machine—geared
to tracking, moment by moment, the non-verbal
signals of the innermost feelings of others.’ ([4],
p.119)
Sarah is just one of the many curious characters
who populate lay science books about gender. She
can be found in Louann Brizendine’s book The
Female Brain, one of several recent popular and
influential books arguing for fundamental and ‘hard-
wired’ differences in male and female psychology.
Unfortunately, scientific accuracy and common-
sense are often casualties in the ugly rush to cloak
old-fashioned sexism in the respectable and authori-
tative language of neuroscience [10, 19]. Mark
Liberman, whose online Language Log offers wry
and meticulous critiques of pseudoscientific claims
about gender differences, has described some popular
authors’ use of the neuroscientific literature as
“shockingly careless, tendentious and even dishonest.
Their over-interpretation and misinterpretation of
scientific research is so extreme that it becomes a
form of fabrication.” [18].
Then, too, with the buzz-phrase ‘hard-wiring’ comes
an extraordinary insistence on locating social pressures
in the brain. In The Female Brain, for example, the
working mother learns that she is struggling against
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“the natural wiring of our female brains and biological
reality” (p. 161). According to Brizendine, combining
motherhood with career gives rise to a neurological
“tug-of-war because of overloaded brain circuits”
(p. 160). Career circuits and maternal circuits battle it
out, leading to “increased stress, increased anxiety, and
reduced brainpower for the mother’s work and her
children.” (p. 112). But Brizendine promises her
female readers that “understanding our innate biology
empowers us to better plan our future.” (p. 159). It
may startle some readers to learn that family friendly
workplace policies are not the solution to reduced
maternal stress and anxiety, and that fathers who do
the kindergarten pick-ups, pack the lunch-boxes, stay
home when the kids are sick, get up in the night when
the baby wakes up, and buy the birthday presents and
ring the paediatrician in their lunch hour are not the
obvious solution to enhanced maternal ‘brainpower’.
No, it is an appreciation of female brain wiring that
will see the working mother through the hard times.
(Predictably, Brizendine never even hints that the over-
wired working mother consider the simplest antidote
to the ill-effects of going against her ‘natural wiring’:
namely, giving her partner a giant kick up the
neurological backside.)
What accounts for the success and appeal of the new
field of neurosexism? Most lay readers, of course, have
neither the background nor the resources to question the
many inaccurate and misleading claims made about
gender differences in the brain. There is also recent
evidence that neuroscientific explanations enjoy a
special “seductive allure” [20]. People’s capacity to
spot the unsatisfactory nature of circular psychological
explanations is significantly reduced when impressive-
sounding neuroscientific terms are introduced.
Yet surely there is more to it than this? The back
cover of The Female Brain offers to explain why “a
man can’t seem to spot an emotion unless someone
cries or threatens bodily harm”. Were we to pick up a
different sort of book that made an equally unusual
sort of claim (a guide to pets, say, which promised to
explain why cats can’t climb trees), we would
immediately put it down and go in search of a more
reliable text. Yet The Female Brain is a New York
Times bestseller, translated into twenty-one languages
and featured in newspapers, magazines and TV shows
around the world. What, exactly, is the draw of gender
stereotypes dressed up as neuroscience? For men,
perpetuation of the idea that they lack women’s hard-
wired empathizing skills is a small price to pay for
licence to lay claim to more valued and potentially
profitable psychological advantages. According to
another popular book about gender difference, The
Essential Difference [1], “[t]he female brain is pre-
dominantly hard-wired for empathy. The male brain is
predominantly hard-wired for understanding and build-
ing systems.” (p.1). As Levy [16] notes, this translates
to the idea that “on average, women’s intelligence is
best employed in putting people at their ease, while the
men get on with understanding the world and building
and repairing the things we need in it.” (pp. 319–320).
Levy adds, “[t]his is no basis for equality. It is not an
accident that there is no Nobel Prize for making people
feel included.” (p. 323).
For women, a possible explanation of the appeal of
neurosexism lies in the palliative system justification
motive, “whereby people justify and rationalise the
way things are, so that existing social arrangements
are perceived as fair and legitimate, perhaps even
natural and inevitable.” ([11], p. 119). Jost and col-
leagues have found that lower status groups have a
remarkable capacity to rationalize what goes against
their self-interests, internalize limiting stereotypes,
and find legitimacy in the very inequalities that hold
them back (see, for example [12]; [11]). If a frazzled
mother can tell herself that her hard-wired powers of
female empathy uniquely position her to intuit that
the red-faced, cross-patch baby wants to get down
from the highchair, then there’s no need to feel cross
that she’s the only one who ever seems to notice. If
she can take seriously Brizendine’s claim that it is
only when the children leave home that “the mommy
brain circuits are finally free to be applied to new
ambitions, new thoughts, new ideas” ([4], p. 143) she
may feel less resentful that the autonomy to pursue a
career unhindered, a freedom still taken for granted by
her partner, is now no longer extended to her.
Similarly, Davis [9] has recently suggested that
gender role attitudes may fall in line with life, rather
than vice versa. Davis’ recent longitudinal study of
gender ideology found that young adults shed their
gender egalitarian beliefs once they had children, but
only so long as their procreation was normatively
timed, indicating that it is not the experience of having
children per se that causes gender ideology to change
[9]. Rather, there may be something special about
taking on a culturally loaded adult role. Davis asks
whether it is, “because there are few structures in
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place to support egalitarian marriages and child-
rearing practices that individuals fall away from
egalitarian practices and, as a reflection of their new
interests, alter their belief structure to reduce cogni-
tive dissonance?” ([9]; p. 1037). And as Cameron [5]
has noted in her popular critique The myth of Mars
and Venus, the effect, and also perhaps the appeal, of
the idea of “timeless, natural, and inevitable” differ-
ences between the sexes is that it “stops us thinking
about what social arrangements might work better
than our present ones in a society that can no longer
be run on the old assumptions about what men and
women do.” (p. 177). Popular neurosexism permits us
to sit back and relax, with its seemingly neat explanation
of our social structure and personal lives. The answer,
‘Oh, it’s the brain,’ offers a tidy justification for
accepting the status quo with clear conscience.
We can currently only speculate on the enervating
effect of popular gender science books on male
nappy-changing frequencies, or female patterns of
leaving the toilet to be cleaned by someone else.
However, there is evidence that accounts of gender
that emphasise biological factors leave us more
inclined to agree with gender stereotypes, to self-
stereotype ourselves, and for our performance to fall
in line with those stereotypes (e.g., [2, 7, 8]).
Moreover, other research from the social psycholog-
ical literature has shown that presenting cognitive or
emotional tasks in ways that make them seem
diagnostic of gender tends to set up a self-fulfilling
prophecy (e.g., [3, 14, 15, 21–24]). Research such as
this underlines the point that,
‘the psyche is … not a discrete entity packed in
the brain. Rather, it is a structure of psycholog-
ical processes that are shaped by and thus
closely attuned to the culture that surrounds
them … the mind cannot be understood without
reference to the sociocultural environment to
which it is adapted and attuned.’ ([13], p. xiii).
This important observation is one usually ignored
by popular accounts of gendered ‘hard-wiring’.
Mark Liberman has suggested that “misleading
appeals to the authority of ‘brain research’ have
become the modern equivalent of out-of-context
scriptural fragments.” [18]. Noting, along with Rivers
and Barnett [19], that baseless neuroscientific ‘facts’
about gender differences are already having an impact
on educational policies, for example, he argues that
journalists have a real responsibility to fact-check the
accuracy of neuroscientific claims. The need for
journalists to take on this responsibility takes on an
extra import when one considers our susceptibility to
poor neuroscientific explanations, together with the
way that biological accounts of gender, and the
stereotypes about male versus female abilities that
they promote, can measurably alter our beliefs, self-
identity and abilities.
Finally, of course, let’s not forget the sheer embar-
rassment factor. The successful nineteenth century
book, Sex in Education (subtitled Or, A Fair Chance
for Girls – somewhat ironically as it turned out) argued
that education was selectively perilous to girls and
young women. Its author, Harvard Medical School
professor Edward Clarke [6], proposed that intellectual
labour sent energy rushing dangerously from ovaries to
brain, threatening infertility as well as other severe
medical ills. From our modern vantage point we can
laugh at the crudely obvious prejudice that gave rise to
this hypothesis (as biologist Richard Lewontin [17],
p. 208 dryly remarked of this hypothesis, ‘Testicles,
apparently, had their own sources of energy’).
Yet it seems we may have little cause for
complacency. Who wants future generations to giggle
in astonished outrage at our crude attempts to locate
social pressures in the brain? (Here it is, Michael! I
finally found the elusive human ‘maternal circuit’.
See how it crowds out these circuits for career,
ambition and original thought?). Nineteenth century
medical opinion proposed that girls who overtax their
brains might never reproduce. Twenty-first century
neurosexism warns that women who reproduce risk
overtaxing their brains. It is, perhaps, a little less progress
than many working mothers would have hoped for.
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